# 1NC

### 1

#### Our interpretation is the aff has to defend instrumental implementation of an example of the resolutional statement

#### The resolution indicates affs should advocate topical government change

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Statutory restrictions mandate government action

Kershner 10 (Joshua, Articles Editor, Cardozo Law Review. J.D. Candidate (June 2011), Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, “Political Party Restrictions and the Appointments Clause: The Federal Election Commission's Appointments Process Is Constitutional” Cardozo Law Review de novo 2010 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 615)

The process by which the President fills an Executive Branch position is governed by the Appointments Clause: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. n81 This process is divided into three phases: (1) Congress creates an Executive Branch position by statute; n82 (2) the President nominates an individual to fill the position; n83 and (3) the Senate confirms the nominee. n84 The Clause covers a specified list of positions and the generic "other Officers of the United States." n85 The Clause controls who nominates, appoints, and confirms an individual for such a position. n86 Finally, the Clause defines a separate process for inferior officers. n87 It should be noted, however, that the Appointments Clause limits but does not empower Congress to create positions. n88 That power comes from the Necessary and Proper Clause. n89 The House of Representatives has no role in the process of nomination and appointment and is specifically not mentioned in the [\*626] Appointments Clause. All of the powers contained in the Appointments Clause are reserved to the President, the Senate, or both. n90 The Appointments Clause makes a distinction between the power to nominate and the separate power to appoint. The power of nomination is textually reserved to the President of the United States, n91 whereas the power of appointment is shared by the President and the Senate. n92 Statutory restrictions violate the plain text of the Appointments Clause because the very act of passing a statute requires the involvement of the House of Representatives. n93 Statutory restrictions on the appointments process are further problematic because the Appointments Clause's power to nominate is vested solely in the President. n94 Those statutory restrictions that limit the President's power to nominate violate the plain text of the Clause. n95 Where the Constitution provides a clear procedural process, the Supreme Court has consistently applied strict principles of formalism, construing the text so as to limit, rather than expand, the powers of the various branches of government. n96 The Senate's role in the appointments process is the final confirmation of a nominee. n97 The "advice and consent" of the Senate applies only to the appointment power. n98 The President and the Senate have interpreted advice as non-binding guidance, and have interpreted [\*627] consent as the act of confirmation. n99 Thus, the Appointments Clause gives the Senate only the narrow function of confirming nominees. n100

#### So do judicial restrictions

Singer 7 (Jana, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, SYMPOSIUM A HAMDAN QUARTET: FOUR ESSAYS ON ASPECTS OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: HAMDAN AS AN ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER, Maryland Law Review 2007 66 Md. L. Rev. 759)

n25. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance of courts "to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs"); see also Katyal, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that "in war powers cases, the passive virtues operate at their height to defer adjudication, sometimes even indefinitely"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1313-17 (1988) (discussing the Court's use of justiciability doctrines to refuse to hear challenges to the President's authority in cases involving foreign affairs); Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court's Noninterference with the Guardians of National Security, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1122, 1124-38 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's general policy of nonintervention in cases concerning actions of governmental agencies and political entities in national security matters); Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 433-34 (1989) (discussing the use of the political question doctrine as a means to avoid judicial restrictions on presidential power in cases involving military force).

#### Two reasons our interpretation is best -

#### First is limits. Allowing affs that are only tangentially related to the topic allows an unlimited number of affs (prisons, immigration, etc) where the aff would always have the literature advantage. Even if they win that those affs are debatable, the aff would always have the literature and expertise advantage against impact turns to their aff. They also force the negative to engage in limitless research to prepare for every conceivable approach to the topic, making debate A) inaccessible to people that have to work for a living and B) even more biased toward schools with large coaching staffs.

#### Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable controversy without sacrificing creativity or openness

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as ~~human~~ beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### 2. Education. Policy focus is key – disengagement from politics abdicates responsibility and decreases governmental responsibility – especially true for war powers

Mellor 2013

[Ewan, European University Institute, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs”, http://www.academia.edu/4175480/Why\_policy\_relevance\_is\_a\_moral\_necessity\_Just\_war\_theory\_impact\_and\_UAVs\]

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51

#### Decisionmaking skills gained from debate are key to problem solving in all facets of life—outweighs the case

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp. 9-10

If we assume it to be possible **without** recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of ~~man~~ and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14 I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of ~~man~~ in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13 Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained. Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually. When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided: A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision… The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision… It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16 John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors. We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### Third is Ground,

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

**Galloway 7** – professor of communications at Samford University (Ryan, “Dinner And Conversation At The Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

### Case

#### Evolution makes us/them distinctions inevitable

Thayer 2004

[Bradley, Associate Professor for the Department of Defense & Strategic Studies and a former Fellow @ the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict]

Evolutionary theory allows realists to advance offensive realist arguments without seeking an ultimate cause in either the anarchic international state system or in theological or metaphysical ideas. Realism based on evolutionary theory reaches the same conclusions, but the ultimate causal mechanism is different: human evolution in the anarchic and perilous conditions of the late-Pliocene, Pleistocene, and most of the Holocene epochs. Specially, evolutionary theory explains why humans are egoistic, strive to dominate others, and make in-group/out-group distinctions. These adaptations in turn serve as a foundation for offensive realism. The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states are forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great-so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high-without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift-survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. The environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits are sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family’s or tribe’s need for food, shelter, or other resources). Evolutionary theory explains why people seek control over environmental circumstances-humans are egoistic and concerned about food-and why some, particularly males, will seek to dominate others by maintaining a privileged position in a dominance hierarchy. Clearly, as the leaders of states are human, they too will be influenced by evolutionary theory as they respond to the actions of other states and as they make their own decisions.

#### Evaluate impacts – anything else de-values the lives that are lost as a result of their ethic

Cummiskey 96 David Cummiskey, Associate Professor of Philosophy @ Bates College & a Ph.D. from UM, 1996, Kantian Consequentialism, Pg. 145-146

In the next section, I will defend this interpretation of the duty of beneficence. For the sake of argument, however, let us first simply assume that beneficence does not require significant self-sacrifice and see what follows. Although Kant is unclear on this point, we will assume that significant self-sacrifices are supererogatory. Thus, if I must harm one in order to save many, the individual whom I will harm by my action is not morally required to affirm the action. On the other hand, I have a duty to do all that I can for those in need. As a consequence **I am faced with a dilemma: If I act, I harm a person in a way that a rational being need not consent to; if I fail to act, then I do not do my duty to those in need and thereby fail to promote an objective end.** Faced with such a choice, which horn of the dilemma is more consistent with the formula of the end-in-itself? **We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.”** Instead, **the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons.** Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “**to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he [or she] is a separate person, that** ~~his~~ **is the only life he [or she] has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction.** In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? **A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself.”** Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. **If one truly believes that all** rational beings **have an equal value then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many** rational beings **as possible**. **In order to avoid this** conclusion, **the non-consequentialist** Kantian **needs to justify agent-centered constraints.** As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian **deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value based rationale.** But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? **If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity,** that is, **an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value, but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others. The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others**. If on focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then **equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many**.

#### Default to falsifiable alternatives—empirical reality is the only legitimate means of taking action

**Donovan**, ‘**4** [John, Director of the Microanalytical Facility, University of Oregon, Selections from the Post-Modernism Thread, Science vs. Postmodernism Debate, Last Updated Dec. 29, http://www.uoregon.edu/~donovan/debates/Selections%20from%20the%20Postmodernism%20thread.pdf]

This is such a ridiculous and backwards misunderstanding of how science actually functions I'm not even sure where to start. Listen, despite what your teachers may have told you, as a scientist that has seen blood on the floor, I can assure you that science thrives on challenges to authority. Every scientific theory that has been falsified is a testament to that process. On the other hand, I see that Anthro departments continue to play politics as usual without regard to empirical reality (since that's all they actually have to play with). It's actually the PoMo's that constantly appeal to the pretentious wordplay and authority of Foucault, Lacan, Derrida, etc. to suppress internal criticism and create fear. One benefit the Sokal Hoax had was to embolden many in Literature and other Humanities departments to finally speak out and say "We've been too fearful to say it, but yes, he's right- this is all a bunch of crap, and I'm glad he showed everyone the lack of academic credibility and rational scholarly standards in these so called philosophers." PoMo likes to say that everything is "politics", but as Richard Feynman said: "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled."

#### No risk of militarism escalating

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

#### Err neg on impacts

#### A. Root cause claims fail

Brian **Martin**, Professor of Science, Technology and Society at the University of Wollongong, **‘90** (http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html)

In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of structures and factors which have some connection with the war system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: **attention should not be focused on one single factor to the exclusion of others.** This is often done for example by some Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and other social problems, and by some **feminists** who **attribute most problems to patriarchy. The danger of monocausal explanations is that they may lead to an** inadequate political practice. The 'revolution' may be followed by the persistence or even expansion of many problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective. The one connecting feature which I perceive in the structures underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the military. Furthermore, **these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other, and sometimes conflict.** This means that **the struggle against war can and must be undertaken at** many different levels**. It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community.** Furthermore, **the different struggles need to be linked together.** That is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them.

#### B. War causes their impacts

Joshua S. **Goldstein** (prof of IR @ American U, Wash D.C.) **‘1** War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge University Press. pp. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that **causality runs** at least as strongly the other way**.** War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, **war has** in part **fueled and sustained** these and other **injustices**. So, “**if you want peace, work for peace.**” Indeed, **if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace**. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that **changes in attitudes towards war** and the military **may be the** most important **way to “reverse women’s oppression.”** The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.10

#### Discourse questions will never be fully settled---must take action even under conditions of uncertainty

Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

**Executive flexibility is critical to the War on Terror**

**Groves 4/10** – Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation (Steven, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad”, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad>, CMR)

What the U.S. Should Do¶ **The U.S. drone program and its practices regarding targeted strikes against al-Qaeda and its associated forces are lawful**. They are lawful **because the U**nited **S**tates **is currently engaged in an armed conflict with those terrorist entities** and because the United States has an inherent right to defend itself against imminent threats to its security. Moreover, the available evidence indicates that **U.S. military and intelligence forces conduct targeted strikes in a manner consistent with international law**. **Military and intelligence officials go to great lengths to identify al-Qaeda operatives that pose an imminent threat and continually reassess the level of that threat**. **Decisions on each potential target are debated among U.S. officials before the target is placed in the “disposition matrix.”** In conducting targeted strikes **U.S. forces strive to minimize civilian casualties**, although such casualties cannot always be prevented.¶ **The** **U**nited **S**tates **will continue to face asymmetric threats from non-state actors** operating from the territory of nations that are either unwilling or unable to suppress the threats. **To confront these threats,** **the U**nited **S**tates **must** retain **its most effective operational** capabilities, **including** targeted strikes by armed **drones**, even if U.S. forces degrade al-Qaeda and its associated forces to such an extent that the United States no longer considers itself to be in a non-international armed conflict. Moreover, **the U**nited **S**tates **must continue to affirm its inherent right to self-defense to eliminate threats to its national security, regardless of the presence or absence of an armed conflict recognized by international law**.¶ To that end, **the U**nited **S**tates **should**:¶ Continue to affirm existing use-of-force authorities. During the past three years, senior officials of the Obama Administration have publicly set out in significant detail U.S. policies and practices regarding drone strikes. The Administration should continue to do so, emphasizing that U.S. policies adhere to widely recognized international law. Critics of the United States will continue to claim that a lack of transparency surrounds U.S. policy and actions. Such critics will likely never be satisfied, not even with full disclosure of the relevant classified legal memoranda, and their criticism will not cease until the United States abandons its practice of targeting terrorist threats in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere. However, consistent repetition of the U.S. legal position on targeted drone strikes may blunt such criticism.¶ **Not derogate from the AUMF**. At the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, NATO agreed that the vast majority of U.S. and other NATO forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, a time frame that President Obama confirmed during this year’s State of the Union address. Some critics of U.S. drone policy will inevitably argue that due to the drawdown the United States may no longer credibly claim that it remains in a state of armed conflict with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and its associated forces, whether they are located in Afghanistan, the FATA, or elsewhere. **Congress should pass no legislation that could be** interpreted **as a derogation from the AUMF or an erosion of the inherent right of the** **U**nited **S**tates **to defend itself against imminent threats posed by transnational terrorist organizations**.¶ **Not create a drone court**. The concept of **a drone court is fraught with danger and may be an unconstitutional interference with the executive branch’s authority to wage war.** **U.S. armed forces have been lawfully targeting enemy combatants in armed conflicts for more than 200 years without being second-guessed** by Congress or a secret “national security court.” **Targeting decisions**, including those made in connection with drone strikes, **are carefully deliberated by military officers and intelligence officials based on facts and evidence gathered from a variety of** human, signals, and imagery **intelligence sources**. During an armed conflict, all al-Qaeda operatives are subject to targeting; therefore, **a drone court scrutinizing targeting decisions would serve no legitimate purpose.**¶ Rather than creating a special tribunal that is ill equipped to pass judgment on proportionality and military necessity, and that will never fully assuage the concerns of the critics of drone strikes, **Congress should continue to leave decisions pertaining to the disposition of al-Qaeda terrorists**—including U.S. citizens—**with military and intelligence officials**.¶ Conclusion¶ The debate within the international legal, academic, and human rights communities on the legality and propriety of drone strikes will likely continue unabated. To surrender to the demands of such critics would be equivalent to forgetting the lessons of September 11, when a small, non-state terrorist organization operating from a nation with which the United States was not at war planned and launched an attack that killed almost 3,000 Americans.¶ **The U**nited **S**tates **should preserve its ability to use all of the tools in its arsenal** **to ensure that the plots hatched by terrorist organizations do not become successful attacks on the U.S. homeland**. **Armed drones have proved to be one of the most effective and discriminating tools available to U.S. forces, and their lawful use should continue until such time as** non-state, **transnational terrorist organizations no longer present an imminent threat** to the United States.

#### Counter-terror policy is key – changes collapse our ability to fight the war on terror

Byman 12 – Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy (Daniel L, “The Next President Should Keep After al Qaeda but Mend Relations with Congress on Terrorism”, April 20, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/20-terrorism-wittes-byman>, CMR)

The next president—whether that is Obama or one of his Republican challengers—should not, and likely will not, alter the twin strategic pillars of American counterterrorism policy put in place in recent years: robust law enforcement efforts domestically coupled with vigorous covert and military targeting of al Qaeda’s core and affiliated groups in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere. U.S. counterterrorism policy must center on fighting enemy groups in Pakistan and Yemen despite the death of bin Laden and al-Awlaki. These two countries provide terrorist groups like al Qaeda with the secure havens they need to maintain their strength and remain a deadly danger. Because both countries pose this danger and are also fitful counterterrorism partners, the United States must continue an aggressive campaign—using both drones and special forces—of targeting the enemy with lethal force. Conservatives may complain about using law enforcement to handle terrorism cases, but no plausible alternative to the criminal justice system exists for the volume of serious cases the FBI and federal prosecutors are overseeing in the homeland. For all the noise on the political Left about abandoning the war and covert action paradigms and on the political Right about the exclusivity of the military detention and trial models, no prospect for either exists—no matter who is president. ¶ At the same time, many U.S. counterterrorism successes occur daily, and quietly, in cooperation with allied intelligence and law enforcement services, which arrest and detain suspected terrorists around the globe. The United States must make every effort to maintain and even expand such efforts: they usually incur little cost economically and diplomatically, yet are highly effective. Such cooperation often means working under tension with unsavory and undemocratic partners in places like Jordan or Bahrain, where the United States might be contributing to the repressive capacity of a regime in the name of counterterrorism even as that regime moves to curtail democratization, at times brutally, in a way the United States opposes. Should the forces of democracy survive and take over, the United States will have to forge new relationships with the often-suspicious replacements. None of this will change whether a Republican or a Democrat wins the next election. ¶ For that very reason, the next administration must make the parameters of the American consensus on the parameters of the fight against terrorism clearer to the public. For a start, it might continue addressing the following questions: Under what conditions will the United States kill terrorist leaders? How many civilian deaths are acceptable when it does? What sort of intelligence evidence is necessary before it acts? The United States has taken important steps to lay out these criteria without revealing sensitive intelligence information or methods and in so doing improve the public and elite debate on counterterrorism and thus make overall policy more robust. The next administration should do more still in this regard. ¶ Above all, the next administration must settle relations with Congress on counterterrorism matters, to establish a set of working understandings with the legislature regarding the legitimacy of counterterrorism options that the executive needs to keep on the table. Some of what Congress has wished to do—reauthorize and update the AUMF to describe the war America is now fighting, rather than the war it set out to fight more than a decade ago—is quite reasonable in principle, though the specific proposals may require considerable work. Some actions of Congress have been frankly destructive, particularly its efforts to impede the use of the domestic criminal justice system, mandate military detention, and encumber the transfer of detainees from military custody. The next president will have to engage more constructively with the legislature than Obama has to date, working with members to improve and polish ideas with promise and stop proposals that restrict executive flexibility in a conflict that requires flexibility.

#### Their criticism links

Anderson 13

[Kenneth, Professor of Law, Visiting Fellow, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Member, Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law, Non-Resident Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution (Governance Studies), Senior Fellow, The Rift Valley Institute, “The Case for Drones”, 5/24, <http://dyn.realclearpolitics.com/printpage/?url=http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the_case_for_drones_118548-full.html>, CMR]

Without a hardheaded effort on the part of Congress and the executive branch to make drone policy, the efforts to discredit drones will continue. The current wide public support in the United States today should not mask the ways in which public perception and sentiment can be shifted, here and abroad. The campaign of **delegitimation is modeled on** the one against **Guantanamo** Bay during the George W. Bush administration; the British campaigning organization Reprieve tweets that it will make drones the Obama administration’s Guantanamo. Then as now, administration officials did not, or were unforgivably slow to, believe that a mere civil-society campaign could force a reset of their policies. **They** miscalculated then and, as former Bush administration officials John Bellinger and Jack Goldsmith have repeatedly warned, they **might** well **be** miscalculating now.¶ U.S. counterterrorism policy overall needs to be embedded in policies, processes, and laws that get beyond mere executive-branch discretion and bear the stamp of the two political branches coming together in tools available in a stable way across presidential administrations of both parties. We are not there now. While the critics are not wrong to call for reform of drone-warfare processes, many of them see these merely as the first step to ending drone warfare altogether. They are advocating procedural reforms not to give it a permanent and steady framework for the long run, but effectively to outlaw the practice.

#### Any alternative risks extinction

Louis Rene Beres 11, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue, 2011, “After Osama bin Laden: Assassination, Terrorism, War, and International Law,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 93

Even after the U.S. assassination of Osama bin Laden, we are still left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be construed, at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate instance of anticipatory self-defense. Arguably, the enhanced permissibility of anticipatory self-defense that follows generally from the growing destructiveness of current weapons technologies in rogue hands may be paralleled by the enhanced permissibility of assassination as a particular strategy of preemption. Indeed, where assassination as anticipatory self-defense may actually prevent a nuclear or other highly destructive form of warfare, reasonableness dictates that it could represent distinctly, even especially, law-enforcing behavior.

For this to be the case, a number of particular conditions would need to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited to the greatest extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state. Second, the assassination would have to conform to all of the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity. Third, the assassination would need to follow intelligence assessments that point, beyond a reasonable doubt, to preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly destructive warfare within the intended victim's state. Fourth, the assassination would need to be founded upon carefully calculated judgments that it would, in fact, prevent the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harm [\*114] to civilian populations than would all of the alternative forms of anticipatory self-defense.

Such an argument may appear manipulative and dangerous; permitting states to engage in what is normally illegal behavior under the convenient pretext of anticipatory self-defense. Yet, any blanket prohibition of assassination under international law could produce even greater harm, compelling threatened states to resort to large-scale warfare that could otherwise be avoided. Although it would surely be the best of all possible worlds if international legal norms could always be upheld without resort to assassination as anticipatory self-defense, the persisting dynamics of a decentralized system of international law may sometimes still require extraordinary methods of law-enforcement. n71

Let us suppose, for example, that a particular state determines that another state is planning a nuclear or chemical surprise attack upon its population centers. We may suppose, also, that carefully constructed intelligence assessments reveal that the assassination of selected key figures (or, perhaps, just one leadership figure) could prevent such an attack altogether. Balancing the expected harms of the principal alternative courses of action (assassination/no surprise attack v. no assassination/surprise attack), the selection of preemptive assassination could prove reasonable, life-saving, and cost-effective.

What of another, more common form of anticipatory self-defense? Might a conventional military strike against the prospective attacker's nuclear, biological or chemical weapons launchers and/or storage sites prove even more reasonable and cost-effective? A persuasive answer inevitably depends upon the particular tactical and strategic circumstances of the moment, and on the precise way in which these particular circumstances are configured.

But it is entirely conceivable that conventional military forms of preemption would generate tangibly greater harms than assassination, and possibly with no greater defensive benefit. This suggests that assassination should not be dismissed out of hand in all circumstances as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under international law. [\*115]

What of those circumstances in which the threat to particular states would not involve higher-order (WMD) n72 military attacks? Could assassination also represent a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under these circumstances? Subject to the above-stated conditions, the answer might still be "yes." The threat of chemical, biological or nuclear attack may surely enhance the legality of assassination as preemption, but it is by no means an essential precondition. A conventional military attack might still, after all, be enormously, even existentially, destructive. n73 Moreover, it could be followed, in certain circumstances, by unconventional attacks.

#### Pacifism fails---too optimistic and speculative

Brian Orend 6, Director of International Studies, and a Professor of Philosophy, at the University of Waterloo in Canada, "The Morality of War", Broadview Press, Google Books, p. 263

Summary¶ The goal of this chapter was to discuss and evaluate the pacifist alternative to just war theory. We described various pacifist arguments with considerable care and charity. But the arguments for TP. CP and DP are, in the final analysis, not as strong as those of just war theory. Pacifism, while well-intentioned seems, in effect, to reward aggression and to fail to take measures needed to protect people from aggression. Pacifism is also premised on an excessively optimistic view of the world. It does offer an alternative to armed resistance, but the success of this method historically seems deeply questionable. The method of systematic civil disobedience in the face of aggression remains essentially untried, for it has worked only in cases where the target was morally sensitive to begin with. When the target or aggressor is not sensitive, the result of this method is pure speculation. Pacifists hope it will work—and hope is a virtue—but this ultimately makes me wonder very seriously whether pacifism can actually be divorced from religion. It would seem that only under the warm blanket of religious faith could pacifism’s prospects, in our rough- and-tumble world, seem promising.

#### Our method is solid– it’s not a view from nowhere, but a close and accurate description of reality that incorporates situated knowledge – they have to refute our specific truth claims

Dennett 3 (Daniel, prominent American philosopher whose research centers on philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of biology, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science, currently the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies and the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University, “Postmodernism and Truth”, 2-3, <http://www.butterfliesandwheels.com/articles.php>, CMR)

**We alone can be wracked with doubt, and we alone have been provoked by that epistemic itch to seek a remedy: better truth-seeking methods**. Wanting to keep better track of our food supplies, our territories, our families, our enemies, we discovered the benefits of talking it over with others, asking questions, passing on lore. We invented culture. **Then** **we invented** measuring**, and** arithmetic, and maps, and writing. **These communicative and recording innovations come with a built-in ideal:** truth**. The point of asking questions is to find** true answers**; the point of measuring is to** measure accurately; the point of making maps is to find your way to your destination. There may be an Island of the Colour-blind (allowing Oliver Sacks his usual large dose of poetic license), but no Island of the People Who Do Not Recognize Their Own Children. The Land of the Liars could exist only in philosophers' puzzles; there are no traditions of False Calendar Systems for mis-recording the passage of time. In short, the goal of truth goes without saying, in every human culture. We human beings use our communicative skills not just for truth-telling, but also for promise-making, threatening, bargaining, story-telling, entertaining, mystifying, inducing hypnotic trances, and just plain kidding around, but prince of these activities is truth-telling, and for this activity we have invented ever better tools. **Alongside our tools for agriculture, building, warfare, and transportation, we have created a technology of truth: science**. Try to draw a straight line, or a circle, "freehand." Unless you have considerable artistic talent, the result will not be impressive. **With a straight edge and a compass,** on the other hand, **you can practically** eliminate **the sources of human variability and get a** nice clean, objective result, the same every time. Is the line really straight? How straight is it? **In response to these questions, we develop ever finer tests, and then tests of the accuracy of those tests, and so forth, bootstrapping our way to ever greater accuracy and objectivity**. Scientists are just as vulnerable to wishful thinking, just as likely to be tempted by base motives, just as venal and gullible and forgetful as the rest of humankind. Scientists don't consider themselves to be saints; they don't even pretend to be priests (who according to tradition are supposed to do a better job than the rest of us at fighting off human temptation and frailty). **Scientists** take themselves to be just as weak and fallible as anybody else, but recognizing those very sources of error in themselves and in the groups to which they belong, they **have devised** elaborate systems **to** tie their own hands**, forcibly** preventing their frailties and prejudices from infecting their results. It is not just the implements, the physical tools of the trade, that are designed to be resistant to human error. The organization of methods is also under severe selection pressure for improved reliability and objectivity. The classic example is the double blind experiment, in which, for instance, neither the human subjects nor the experimenters themselves are permitted to know which subjects get the test drug and which the placebo, so that nobody's subliminal hankerings and hunches can influence the perception of the results. The statistical design of both individual experiments and suites of experiments, is then embedded in the larger practice of routine attempts at replication by independent investigators, which is further embedded in a tradition--flawed, but recognized--of publication of both positive and negative results. What inspires faith in arithmetic is the fact that hundreds of scribblers, working independently on the same problem, will all arrive at the same answer (except for those negligible few whose errors can be found and identified to the mutual satisfaction of all). This unrivalled objectivity is also found in geometry and the other branches of mathematics, which since antiquity have been the very model of certain knowledge set against the world of flux and controversy. In Plato's early dialogue, the Meno, Socrates and the slave boy work out together a special case of the Pythagorean theorem. Plato's example expresses the frank recognition of a standard of truth to be aspired to by all truth-seekers, a standard that has not only never been seriously challenged, but that has been tacitly accepted--indeed heavily relied upon, even in matters of life and death--by the most vigorous opponents of science. (Or do you know a church that keeps track of its flock, and their donations, without benefit of arithmetic?) Yes, but science almost never looks as uncontroversial, as cut-and-dried, as arithmetic. Indeed rival scientific factions often engage in propaganda battles as ferocious as anything to be found in politics, or even in religious conflict. The fury with which the defenders of scientific orthodoxy often defend their doctrines against the heretics is probably unmatched in other arenas of human rhetorical combat. These competitions for allegiance--and, of course, funding--are designed to capture attention, and being well-designed, they typically succeed. This has the side effect that the warfare on the cutting edge of any science draws attention away from the huge uncontested background, the dull metal heft of the axe that gives the cutting edge its power. What goes without saying, during these heated disagreements, is an organized, encyclopedic collection of agreed-upon, humdrum scientific fact. Robert Proctor usefully draws our attention to a distinction between neutrality and objectivity.(2) Geologists, he notes, know a lot more about oil-bearing shales than about other rocks--for the obvious economic and political reasons--but they do know objectively about oil bearing shales. And much of what they learn about oil-bearing shales can be generalized to other, less favored rocks. We want science to be objective; we should not want science to be neutral. Biologists know a lot more about the fruit-fly, Drosophila, than they do about other insects--not because you can get rich off fruit flies, but because you can get knowledge out of fruit flies easier than you can get it out of most other species. Biologists also know a lot more about mosquitoes than about other insects, and here it is because mosquitoes are more harmful to people than other species that might be much easier to study. Many are the reasons for concentrating attention in science, and they all conspire to making the paths of investigation far from neutral; they do not, in general, make those paths any less objective. Sometimes, to be sure, one bias or another leads to a violation of the canons of scientific method. Studying the pattern of a disease in men, for instance, while neglecting to gather the data on the same disease in women, is not just not neutral; it is bad science, as indefensible in scientific terms as it is in political terms. **It is true that past scientific orthodoxies have themselves inspired policies that hindsight reveals to be seriously flawed**. One can sympathize, for instance, with Ashis Nandy, editor of the passionately anti-scientific anthology, Science, Hegemony and Violence: A Requiem for Modernity, Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988. Having lived through Atoms for Peace, and the Green Revolution, to name two of the most ballyhooed scientific juggernauts that have seriously disrupted third world societies, he sees how "the adaptation in India of decades-old western technologies are advertised and purchased as great leaps forward in science, even when such adaptations turn entire disciplines or areas of knowledge into mere intellectual machines for the adaptation, replication and testing of shop-worn western models which have often been given up in the west itself as too dangerous or as ecologically non-viable." (p8) But **we should recognize this as a political misuse of science,** not as a fundamental flaw in science **itself. The methods of science** aren't foolproof, but they **are** indefinitely perfectible. Just as important: there is a tradition of criticism that enforces improvement whenever and wherever flaws are discovered. **The methods of science, like everything else under the sun, are themselves objects of scientific scrutiny, as method becomes methodology**, the analysis of methods. Methodology in turn falls under the gaze of epistemology, the investigation of investigation itself--nothing is off limits to scientific questioning**. The irony is that these fruits of scientific reflection, showing us the ineliminable smudges of imperfection, are sometimes used by those who are suspicious of science as their grounds for denying it a privileged status in the truth-seeking department-**-as if the institutions and practices they see competing with it were no worse off in these regards. But where are the examples of religious orthodoxy being simply abandoned in the face of irresistible evidence? Again and again in science, yesterday's heresies have become today's new orthodoxies. No religion exhibits that pattern in its history.

#### The aff mischaracterizes politics – individual understandings fail to account for situational differences – no risk they affect politics

Robinson(PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05(Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

Lacanian analysis consists mainly of an exercise in projection.  As a result, Lacanian "explanations" often look more propagandistic or pedagogical than explanatory.  A particular case is dealt with only in order to, and to the extent that it can, confirm the already-formulated structural theory.  Judith Butler criticizes Žižek's method on the grounds that 'theory is applied to its examples', as if 'already true, prior to its exemplification'.  'The theory is articulated on its self-sufficiency, and then shifts register only for the pedagogical purpose of illustrating an already accomplished truth'.  It is therefore 'a theoretical fetish that disavows the conditions of its own emergence'[52](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn52).  She alleges that Lacanian psychoanalysis 'becomes a theological project' and also 'a way to avoid the rather messy psychic and social entanglement' involved in studying specific cases[53](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn53).  Similarly, Dominick LaCapra objects to the idea of constitutive lack because specific 'losses cannot be adequately addressed when they are enveloped in an overly generalised discourse of absence... Conversely, absence at a "foundational" level cannot simply be derived from particular historical losses'[54](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn54).  Attacking 'the long story of conflating absence with loss that becomes constitutive instead of historical'[55](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn55), he accuses several theorists of eliding the difference between absence and loss, with 'confusing and dubious results', including a 'tendency to avoid addressing historical problems, including losses, in sufficiently specific terms', and a tendency to 'enshroud, perhaps even to etherealise, them in a generalised discourse of absence'[56](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn56).  Daniel Bensaïd draws out the political consequences of the projection of absolutes into politics.  'The fetishism of the absolute event involves... a suppression of historical intelligibility, necessary to its depoliticization'.  The space from which politics is evacuated 'becomes... a suitable place for abstractions, delusions and hypostases'.  Instead of actual social forces, there are 'shadows and spectres'. The operation of the logic of projection is predictable.  According to Lacanians, there is a basic structure (sometimes called a 'ground' or 'matrix') from which all social phenomena arise, and this structure, which remains unchanged in all eventualities, is the reference-point from which particular cases are viewed.  The "fit" between theory and evidence is constructed monologically by the reduction of the latter to the former, or by selectivity in inclusion and reading of examples.  At its simplest, the Lacanian myth functions by a short-circuit between a particular instance and statements containing words such as "all", "always", "never", "necessity" and so on.  A contingent example or a generic reference to "experience" is used, misleadingly, to found a claim with supposed universal validity.  For instance, Stavrakakis uses the fact that existing belief-systems are based on exclusions as a basis to claim that all belief-systems are necessarily based on exclusions[58](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn58), and claims that particular traumas express an 'ultimate impossibility'[59](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn59).  Similarly, Laclau and Mouffe use the fact that a particular antagonism can disrupt a particular fixed identity to claim that the social as such is penetrated and constituted by antagonism as such[60](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn60).  Phenomena are often analysed as outgrowths of something exterior to the situation in question.  For instance, Žižek's concept of the "social symptom" depends on a reduction of the acts of one particular series of people (the "socially excluded", "fundamentalists", Serbian paramilitaries, etc.) to a psychological function in the psyche of a different group (westerners).  The "real" is a supposedly self-identical principle which is used to reduce any and all qualitative differences between situations to a relation of formal equivalence.  This shows how mythical characteristics can be projected from the outside, although it also raises different problems: the under-conceptualization of the relationship between individual psyches and collective phenomena in Lacanian theory, and a related tendency for psychological concepts to acquire an ersatz agency similar to that of a Marxian fetish.  "The Real" or "antagonism" occurs in phrases which have it doing or causing something. As Barthes shows, myth offers the psychological benefits of empiricism without the epistemological costs.

# 2NC

### Evolutionary Methodology

#### Two standards for arguments: 1. Their Kritik must meet the D-N test and 2. The K must be falsifiable – the evolutionary explanation for social interaction meets both of these

#### Thayer 2004

(Bradley, Professor at Baylor Dept. of Political Science, Darwin and International Relations)

In my discussion of Niebuhr and Morgenthau I demonstrated that realism lacks a scientific ultimate cause for the proximate causes of behavior that those authors identify. Evolutionary theory can provide this foundation for realism and moreover supply ultimate and proximate causes that are both logically coherent and testable. Philosophers of science agree that a theory is better, that is, more scientific, if its ultimate and proximate causes are logically coherent and testable. A realism anchored on evolutionary theory meets these criteria for the first time. In this section I show that evolutionary theory is logically coherent according to two common metrics used in philosophy of science. I then explain how the traits of egoism and the need to dominate may be derived from evolutionary theory. As I explained in chapter 1, evolutionary theory is the result of specific processes, and evolution by natural selection is particularly important for development of human traits, including egoism and the need to dominate. This process is testable, as Darwin proved in his famous example of the species of mocking-thrushes – or finches – of the Galapagos. It does account for observed differences in animal behavior and is rightly accepted as scientific fact. This strongly suggests that human evolution is a better ultimate cause of the behavior expected by realists than the ultimate causes presented by Niebuhr or Morgenthau. But this can also be demonstrated with two common standards that philosophers of science use to evaluate theories: The deductive-nomological (D-N) model developed by Carl Hempel and Karl Popper’s conception of theory falsification, which is known more formally as critical rationalism. Using Hempel’s criteria for the D-N model, evolution is a better ultimate cause because it meets all the criteria of the D-N explanation, unlike Niebuhr’s evil or Morgenthau’s animus dominandi. For Hempel, and indeed almost all philosophers of science, good theories can be logically deduced from their antecedent conditions. Fomally, the D-N model requires that the explanation, or explanans, comprises statements of the antecedent conditions, C, and general laws such as laws of nature L. The explanandum, E, is the descrioption of whatever is being explained, predicted or postdicted. E must follow deductively from C and L. Evolution provides a better ultimate causal foundation according to the D-N model because it tightly fits this model on two levels. First, it explains how life evolves through the evolutionary processes (natural selection, gene mutation, etc.) described in chapter 1 that provide the general laws of evolution and specific antecedent conditions affecting these laws. This theory of how nature evolves may be applied and tested against specific evidence, for example, about how early primates and humans lived and continue to do so, which may confirm evolutionary processes. Second, proximate causes of human (or other animal) behavior may be deduced from it. That is, if the evolutionary process is valid, then much of human behavior must have evolved because the behavior contributed to fitness in past environments. Accordingly, evolutionary theory provides an adequate causal explanation for realism because if the antecedent conditions are provided the ultimate cause logically produces the proximate causes (egoism and domination) of realism. Measured by Popper’s method of falsification, evolutionary theory is also superior to the ultimate causes of Niebuhr and Morgenthau because it is falsifiable. That is, scholars know what evidence would not verify the theory. Popper argued that if a theory is scientific, then we may conceive of observations that would show the theory to be false. His intent was to make precise the idea that scientific theories should be subject to empirical test. In contrast to good scientific theories that can be falsified, Popper suggested that no pattern of human behavior could falsify Marxism or Freudian psychoanalytic theory. More formally, Popper’s criterion of Falsifiability requires that a theory contain “observation sentences”, that is, “proposition P is falsifiable if and only if P deductively implies at least on observation sentence O.” Falsifiable theories contain predictions that may be checked against empirical evidence. So according to Popper, scientists should accept a theory only if it is falsifiable and no observation sentence has falsified it. Evolutionary theory is falsifiable. That is, the conditions under which the theory would be disproved can be derived from the fundamental theory, along with the empirical evidence that would show it to be false. However, Popper himself once charged that evolutionary theory was “not a testable scientific theory.” Popper’s argument with respect to evolutionary theory is incorrect and seems to have stemmed from confusion about its complete contents. He later reversed himself and declared it to be falsifiable. Indeed, evolutionary theory is a testable scientific theory that possesses many falsifiable claims. For example, the key components of evolution, natural selection and genetic variation, have been shown to be falsifiable by Michael Ruse , Elliott Sober, and Mary Williams, among others. Natural selection has been tested against alternative theories of evolution, such as Lamarckism, saltationism, creationism, and orthogenesis and found to possess more logical coherence and to account better for empirical evidence. Although scholars may find this hard to appreciate today, an intense struggle occurred among these competing theories a century ago. However, genetic variation within populations and between and among species has been demonstrated beyond doubt. Thus, in the marketplace of ideas, natural selection has properly won its predominant place. Measured by the two metrics of the D-N model and falsification, evolutionary theory offers a widely accepted scientific explanation of human evolution that is both logically coherent and testable. Thus, it provides a solid foundation for proximate causes of human behavior, such as egoism and domination, and in turn for the realist theory of international relations.

**Util**

#### Even if imperialism somehow leads to erasure of a population, global terminal threats outweigh local personal threats

**Bostrom** **‘2**

[Dr. Nick, Department of Philosophy @ Yale University "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," *Journal of Evolution and Technology*, Vol. 9 - March 2002, http://www.jetpress.org/volume9/risks.html ]

**We can distinguish** six qualitatively **distinct types of risks based on their scope and intensity** (figure 1). The third dimension, probability, can be superimposed on the two dimensions plotted in the figure. Other things equal, **a risk is more serious if it has a substantial probability and if our actions can make that probability significantly greater or smaller. “Personal”, “local”, or “global” refer to the size of the population that is directly affected; a global risk is one that affects the whole of humankind** (and our successors). “Endurable” vs. “terminal” indicates how intensely the target population would be affected. **An endurable risk may cause great destruction, but one can either recover from the damage or find ways of coping with the fallout.** In contrast, **a terminal risk is one where the targets are either annihilated or irreversibly crippled in ways that radically reduce their potential to live the sort of life they aspire to. In the case of personal risks, for instance, a terminal outcome could for example be death,** permanent severe brain injury, or a lifetime prison sentence. An example of **a local terminal risk would be genocide leading to the annihilation of a people** (this happened to several Indian nations). Permanent enslavement is another example.

**MPX---2NC Probability**

**Terrorism is highly likely**

**Neely 13** Megan Neely, is a research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues, “Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism”, March 21, 2013, <http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrence-nuclear-terrorism>, CMR

Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism¶ ¶ **The risk that terrorists will set off a nuclear weapon on U.S. soil is disconcertingly high.** **While a terrorist organization may experience difficulty constructing** nuclear weapons **facilities**, **there is significant concern that terrorists can obtain a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials**. The fear that **an actor could steal a nuclear weapon or fissile material and transport it to the U**nited **S**tates has long-existed.¶ ¶ **It takes a great amount of time** and resources (including territory) to construct centrifuges and reactors **to build a nuclear weapon from scratch. Relatively easily-transportable nuclear weapons**, however, **present one opportunity to terrorists.** For example, exercises similar to the recent **Russian movement of nuclear weapons from munitions depots to storage sites may prove attractive targets.**¶ ¶ **Loose nuclear materials pose a second opportunity**. Terrorists could use them **to create a crude nuclear weapon similar to the gun-type design of Little Boy**. Its **simplicity** – two subcritical masses of highly-enriched uranium – may **make it attractive to terrorists**. While such a weapon might not produce the immediate destruction seen at Hiroshima, the **radioactive fall-out and psychological effects would still be damaging**. **These** two opportunities for terrorists **differ from concerns about a “dirty bomb,**” which mixes radioactive material with conventional explosives.¶ ¶ According to Gary Ackerman of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, the number of terrorist organizations that would detonate a nuclear weapon is probably small. **Few terrorist organizations have the ideology that would motivate nuclear weapons acquisition**. Before we breathe a sigh of relief, we should recognize that **this only increases the “signal-to-noise ratio”: many terrorists might claim to want to detonate a nuclear weapon**, but **the U**nited **S**tates **must find and prevent the small number of groups that actually would.**¶¶ **Transportable nuclear weapons and loose fissile materials grant opportunities to terrorists with nuclear pursuits**. How should the United States seek to undercut the efforts of the select few with a nuclear intent?

**Extinction---equivalent to full-scale nuclear war**

Owen B. **Toon 7**, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and **international economic consequences**. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and **terrorists would be most likely to strike there**. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, **could generate casualties comparable to those** once **predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict**. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives **could lead to significant global climate perturbations** (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

#### Retaliation guarantees extinction

Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

### UQ---Effective Now

#### Yes drones effective – multiple reasons

-a2 intelligence – a2 civilians

Young 13

[Alex, Associate Staff at Harvard Int’l Review, M.D., Harvard University; M.S.H.S., University California Los Angeles, “A Defense of Drones”, Feb 25, <http://hir.harvard.edu/a-defense-of-drones>, CMR]

The reality is not so bleak: drones are very good at what they do. Unmanned attacks are highly effective when it comes to eliminating specific members of terrorist organizations, disrupting terrorist networks without creating too much collateral damage. Their effectiveness makes drone strikes a vital part of US counterterrorism strategy.¶ Predator and Reaper drones are not the indiscriminate civilian-killers that some make them out to be: strikes are targeted and selective. This has become increasingly true as drone technology has improved, and as the military has learned how best to use them. A confluence of factors has made drone strikes much better at eliminating enemy militants while avoiding civilians: drones now carry warheads that produce smaller blast radiuses, and the missiles carrying those warheads are guided using laser, millimeter-wave, and infrared seekers. The result has been less destructive drone strikes that reach their intended target more reliably. A number of non-technological shifts have also made drones a more useful tool: Peter Bergen, a national security analyst for CNN, summarized on July 13th, 2012 that more careful oversight, a deeper network of local informants, and better coordination between the US and Pakistani intelligence communities have also contributed to better accuracy. Data gathered by the Long War Journal indicates that the civilian casualty rate for 2012 and the beginning of 2013 is only 4.5 percent. Even Pakistani Major General Ghayur Mehmood acknowledges that, “most of the targets [of drone strikes] are hard-core militants.” Imprecise drone strikes that cause many civilian casualties are now a thing of the past. This improved accuracy may also help to mitigate anti-American sentiment that stems from civilian casualties.

#### Existing drone strategy effective and sustainable

Young 13

[Alex, Associate Staff at Harvard Int’l Review, M.D., Harvard University; M.S.H.S., University California Los Angeles, “A Defense of Drones”, Feb 25, <http://hir.harvard.edu/a-defense-of-drones>, CMR]

The **Obama** Administration **shows no signs of slowing down** its **drone war**. A drone strike killed two prominent Al Qaeda members in South Waziristan on January 3rd, and four more on January 10th. **Contrary to common criticisms** of drone warfare, though, this **continued** use of unmanned air**strikes is** absolutely **a good course of action** from the CIA and the White House. **Drone warfare has proved to be a step forward**, not backward, **in the** United States’ **struggle to subdue** international **terrorist** organizations. Unmanned air**strikes** **are highly accurate and effective** at disrupting terrorism; **drones** **are and must remain** an **integral** part of the War on Terror.

**UQ---2NC Must-Read**

**Status quo target vetting is carefully calibrated to avoid every aff impact in balance with CT--- there’s only a risk that restrictions destroy it**

Gregory **McNeal 13**, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

**Target vetting is the process by which the government integrates the opinions of subject matter experts from throughout the intelligence community**.180 **The U**nited **S**tates **has developed a formal voting process** **which allows** members of **agencies from across the government to comment on the validity of the target intelligence** and any concerns related to targeting an individual. At a minimum, the vetting considers the following factors: target identification, significance, collateral damage estimates, location issues, impact on the enemy, environmental concerns, and intelligence gain/loss concerns.181 An important part of the analysis also includes assessing the impact of not conducting operations against the target.182 **Vetting occurs at multiple points in the kill-list creation process**, as targets are progressively refined within particular agencies and at interagency meetings.

**A validation step follows the vetting step**. It is intended **to ensure that all proposed targets meet the objectives and criteria outlined in strategic guidance**.183 The term strategic is a reference to national level objectives—**the assessment is not just whether the strike will succeed tactically** (i.e. will it eliminate the targeted individual) **but also** whether it advances broader national policy goals.184 Accordingly, at this stage **there is also a reassessment of whether the killing will comport with domestic legal authorities** such as the AUMF or a particular covert action finding.185 At this stage, participants will also resolve whether the agency that will be tasked with the strike has the authority to do so.186 **Individuals** participating **at this stage analyze the mix of military, political, diplomatic, informational, and economic consequences that flow from killing an individual**. Other questions addressed at this stage are **whether killing an individual will comply with the law of armed conflict, and rules of engagement** (including theater specific rules of engagement). Further bolstering the evidence that these are the key questions that the U.S. government asks is the clearly articulated target validation considerations found in military doctrine (and there is little evidence to suggest they are not considered in current operations). **Some of the questions asked are:**

**• Is attacking the target lawful?** What are the law of war and rules of engagement considerations?

• **Does the target contribute to the adversary's capability** and will **to wage war?**

• Is the target (still) operational? Is it (still) a viable element of a target system? Where is the target located?

• **Will striking the target arouse political or cultural “sensitivities”?**

• How will striking the target affect public opinion? (Enemy, friendly, and neutral)?

• **What is** the relative **potential for collateral damage** or collateral effects, to include casualties?

• What psychological impact will operations against the target have on the adversary, friendly forces, or multinational partners?

• What would be the impact of not conducting operations against the target?187

As the preceding criteria highlight, many of the concerns that critics say should be weighed **in the targeted killing process** are considered prior to nominating a target for inclusion on a kill-list.188 For example, **bureaucrats in the kill-list development process** will weigh whether striking a particular individual will improve world standing **and** whether the strike is worth it in terms of weakening the adversary's power.189 **They** will **analyze the possibility that a strike will adversely affect diplomatic relations**, and they will consider **whether there would be an intelligence loss that outweighs the value of the target**.190 During this process, the intelligence community may also make an estimate regarding the likely success of achieving objectives (e.g. degraded enemy leadership, diminished capacity to conduct certain types of attacks, etc.) associated with the strike. Importantly, **they will also** consider the risk of blowback (e.g. creating more terrorists as a result of the killing).191

**Epist**

#### We don’t need perfect truth – consensus of field experts proves our arguments

Ferguson 2 – Professor of Political Science, Rutgers (Yale, International Relations and the “Third Debate”, ed Jarvis, p 157, CMR)

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), **there is** often **a** sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make **for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy philosophical nit-pickets, but** it can be educational and illuminating. **We gain** a degree of apparently useful “understanding” **about the things we need** (or prefer) **to “know**.”

#### Our use of expert testimony is good – complex issues likes drones require sophisticated solutions grounded in technocratic analysis

Stephen Eric Bronner, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and a Member of the Graduate Faculty in Comparative Literature and German Studies at Rutgers University, 2004 (Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, Published by Columbia University Press, ISBN 9780231126090, p. 77-78) CMR

But **praise for the amateur** also has its limits**. To ignore the need for critical disciplinary intellectuals with various forms of scientific** expertise **is to** [end page 77] **abdicate responsibility for a host of issues involving knowledge of fields ranging from physics and genetics to electronics and even environmentalism. There is surely an overabundance of jargon and mystification and**, as has been mentioned before, **the need exists for a new sensitivity to the vernacular**.39 **But it is also the case that complex issues sometimes require complex language and, often for good reasons, fields generate their own vocabularies**. A judgment is undoubtedly necessary with respect to whether the language employed in a work is necessary for illuminating the issue under investigation: that judgment, however, can never be made in advance. **There must be a place for the technocrat with a political conscience as surely as for the humanist with a particular specialty. The battle against oppression requires a multi-frontal strategy. Best to** consider the words of Primo Levi who **understand**s **the critical intellectual as a "person educated beyond his daily trade, whose culture is alive insofar as it makes an effort to renew itself, and keep up to date, and who does not react with indifference or irritation when confronted by any branch of knowledge, even though, obviously, he cannot cultivate all of them."**40

# 1NR

### Ground

#### Fairness is a decision rule—it rigs the game and makes neutral evaluation by a judge impossible—their ability to pick the high ground is an inequality that ought to be eliminated.

Loland 2 [Sigmund, Professor of Sport Philosophy and Ethics at the Norwegian University of Sport and Physical Education, *Fair Play and Sport*, 95]

Rule violations are of several kinds. The long jumper who steps over the board has her jump measured longer than it really is. By illegally hitting a competitor on the arm, a basketball player ‘steals’ the ball and scores two points. I have argued that without adhering to a shared, just ethos, evaluations of performance among competitors become invalid. Advantages resulting from rule violations that are no part of such an ethos must be considered non-relevant inequalities that ought to be eliminated or compensated for. The argument is similar to that in the discussion of equality. This time, however, we are dealing not with external conditions, equipment, or support systems, but with competitors’ actions themselves.

### Case Outweighs

#### Our arguments address the foundational layer of debate – this comes first

Paul Saurette, PhD Johns Hopkins, 2000 International Journal of Peace Studies 5:1

The problem of concepts -- what they are, where they are located, how we create/discover them -- has always been close to the heart of philosophy and extends deep into the sciences and social sciences.  Within IR, this concern has generally been located in the sphere of methodology and it remains crucial to the various behaviourist - positivist - empiricist - traditionalist debates.  All but the most stubborn empiricists accept that concepts influence our thinking, the validity of studies and the utility of certain perspectives. It is not surprising, then, that some of the most heated debates in the history of IR (and international law) have focused on the proper place, method and definition of certain key concepts such as sovereignty, war, human rights, anarchy, institutions, power, and international. If all concepts are equally created, however, some become represented and treated as more equal than others. There are, in fact, different layers of conceptual understanding and degrees of articulability and these render certain concepts more or less subject to question.[8](http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol5_1/saurette.htm#Notes#Notes) In any debate, certain understandings are shared by its participants and certain concepts must be common for communication to occur.  These concepts become the foundational layer of the debate, rarely being raised for consideration, but profoundly shaping the contours of the debate.  There have been two traditionally philosophical responses to this.  The first, more familiar to mainstream IR, might be seen as the empiricist and positivist response in which the importance of this layer is minimized and its concepts represented as 'preliminary assumptions', 'term variables', or 'operative definitions' -- voluntarily accepted concepts that are hypothetically and tentatively accepted for their heuristic value.  Because many empiricists and positivists accept an understanding of language and thought as transparent and instrumental, they generally assume that, with enough effort, all of our fundamental assumptions and concepts can be clarified and their consequences known -- allowing for, if not truthful representation, then at least useful manipulation.  While this has perhaps been the prevalent view within English philosophy since the scientific revolution, a second approach, what has been called the continental tradition of philosophy, has consistently challenged these premises.  From this perspective, Kant's definition of the project of philosophy as the search for the transcendental conditions of thought and morality is the paradigmatic challenge to the English tradition of empiricism. According to Kant (and shifting him into the language of this essay), there exist certain natural preconditions -- transcendental fields -- of thought that allow us to make sense of experience.  And while some of these necessary preconditions (categories and concepts) can be traced and categorized, others, such as the constitutive and regulative Ideas, cannot be known with the same theoretical rigor.  On this view, the concepts (Ideas) of this deep layer of shared understandings (experience) are not  transparent and available to examination.  Even those we can represent cannot be manipulated and reconfigured.  Far from being heuristic devices of our own making, they are the necessary and universal conditions of possibility for any experience and understanding.

#### Attempting to establish conventions for discourse is an attempt at consensus-building not violent exclusion

Mary Dietz, Professor of Polisci at Minnesota, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 123-4

Habermas's distinction between "pure" communicative action and strategic action raises many difficulties, not the least of which is its adherence to an idealized model of communication that, as Habermas himself acknowledges, does not fit a great deal of everyday social interaction (McCarthy 1991,132). Machiavelli's famous riposte to those thinkers who "have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality" (Machiavelli 1950, 56) seems pertinent here, for the idealized model that Habermas imagines and the distinction that supports it appear boldly to deny the Machia­vellian insight that "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his pres­ervation" (56). I will return to this point as it relates to politics later. For now, it is important to underscore that Habermas relies upon the communicative-strategic distinction to do at least two things: first, to show that on the level of linguistics, communicative action enjoys an "originary" priority over strategic and all other modes of linguistic usage, which are themselves "parasitic" (Rasmussen 1990, 38) or "de­rivative" (McCarthy 1991, 133) upon the former.12 Second, on the level of political theory, Habermas introduces the distinction in order to limit the exercise of threats and coercion (or strategic action) by enu­merating a formal-pragmatic system of discursive accountability (or communicative action) that is geared toward human agreement and mutuality. Despite its thoroughly modern accouterments, communica­tive action aims at something like the twentieth-century discourse-equivalent of the chivalric codes of the late Middle Ages; as a normative system it articulates the conventions of fair and honorable engage­ment between interlocutors. To be sure, Habermas's concept of com­municative action is neither as refined nor as situationally embedded as were the protocols that governed honorable combat across Euro­pean cultural and territorial boundaries and between Christian knights; but it is nonetheless a (cross-cultural) protocol for all that. The entire framework that Habermas establishes is an attempt to limit human violence by elaborating a code of communicative conduct that is de­signed to hold power in check by channeling it into persuasion, or the "unforced" force of the better argument (Habermas 1993b, 160).^

### C/I

#### Their “resolved” and colon arguments make no sense–the affirmative has to defend the proposition that the government should act

Parcher 2001

(Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

### Bad

#### Predictability maintains meaningful politics and empathy even if their DA is correct

Tom Massaro (Prof Law – Florida) 1989 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099)

Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. 52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [\*2111] decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. 53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations. My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. 54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas. Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles. 55 As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization [\*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, 56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal. Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. 57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. 58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings. A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity -- "law for law's sake" -- because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other [\*2113] party to follow them. 59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships. 60

### Must be Radical

#### Our interp solve their radical action args

Betts 1997

(Richard, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and he is Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, World Politics, 50.1)

Two academic pathologies should raise the stock of policy studies. One is that the professional premium on theorizing tends to proliferate theories, promote constant revision of theories, and encourage production of second-rate theories over first-rate applications. Albert Hirschman, with impeccable credentials as a theorist, long ago indicted "the tendency toward compulsive and mindless theorizing." 48 One sure sign of intellectual degeneration in a field is when the logical relationship between generalization and specification is inverted, theories threaten to outnumber their applications, and the shelf life of theoretical work turns out to be hardly longer than that of policy analysis. Some social scientists are untroubled that professional incentives encourage such imbalance, because never having had to meet a payroll in the policy world, they overestimate the ease with which an effective application can be derived from a theoretical insight. Every intellectual would rather be an Einstein than an engineer, but useful knowledge is not advanced if the academy generates a horde of would-be Einsteins but few competent engineers. Strategists are not just engineers, but they consider empiricism and application no less important than the theoretical part of their work. The other pathology is when theorization becomes a closed system, with no connection through which insights can be applied to the outside world--when theorists communicate effectively with no one but each other. When this happens, a theory may remain beautiful but it loses the claim to utility.

 It is the widespread perception in the outside world that theorization is a closed system that makes "academic" a pejorative adjective in normal parlance. A system can be closed in two senses: lack of feedback from policy application, or lack of interest in testing theories against evidence. Both problems are addressed in typical strategic studies research programs that proceed from policy issues, to theoretical formulation, to empirical testing, to policy application. Intellectuals who spend much time in Washington sometimes worry that much theoretical work in contemporary political science reflects both pathologies and has not proved much less ephemeral or more useful than good applications of old theory. Unless academics themselves [End Page 31] become involved on the periphery of policy-making, the only way that their work can have effect outside the closed system in universities is if practitioners read it. Few high-level staff in the U.S. government read anything more academic than Foreign Affairs, and high-level policymakers seldom have time to read any unofficial material but op-ed pieces. One academic journal that is read occasionally in Washington is International Security, because it melds policy analysis and theory. This is one reason it has had a circulation 50 to 80 percent higher than its IPE counterpart International Organization and that academics in other fields sometimes denigrate its academic quality. Some academics may value the aesthetic qualities of theory as much as the utilitarian. Strategists can get as excited as anyone over the elegance of an idea, but see elegance without empirical confirmation and applicability as no more science than art. As Brodie suggested, any criterion for strategy but a utilitarian one is a contradiction in terms: "The question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work? . . . . Strategy is a field where truth is sought in the pursuit of viable solutions." 49

#### The alt doesn’t solve- it will have zero impact on policymakers and cannot formulate a meaningful form of politics to challenge liberal democratic capitalism. Their critique drives a depoliticsing form of fragmentation that destroys the alt’s transformative abilities.

**Kurki, 11**

(Milja, Aberystwyth University, UK The Limitations of the Critical Edge: Reflections on Critical and Philosophical IR Scholarship Today, Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Published Online) <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/05/07/0305829811411997.full.pdf> [9/12/11])

It is a sign of the times that while dissatisfaction with the political and economic struc­tures of society is rife, **academic criticism of the politico-economic system we live in**, and which is simultaneously promulgated by our foreign policy machines around the world, **is surprisingly impotent and ineffective**. The excesses of the liberal capitalist developmental blueprint received a minor ‘rap on the wrists’ by the crisis of 2009, but nevertheless the structure and the external policies of market democracies around the world remain much the same. If the end of the Cold War is supposed to have ‘ended his­tory’, disappointingly it is **the 2009 crisis** that **seems to be a more telling sign of the end of history; it shows that no real ‘ideational’ alternative seems to exist to global capitalism as a model of growth or to the ideals of liberal market democratisation as a way of expanding the sphere of freedom**. **The left and other radical politico-economic models are on the wane** as authoritarian capitalism presents, it seems, the most viable challenge to the hegemony of liberal market democracy. **This pessimism** on the question of progressive alternative politics at a time of crisis **stems from** my recent **research**, **the aim of which has been to interrogate whether room exists for alternative politico-economic visions in today’s democracy assistance.** In its initial stages, this research was driven by an optimistic belief in the power of critical theory to generate new and important avenues for rethinking the deeply consequential policy practice of democracy assistance. Yet, worries have appeared about such pros­pects. One is that **it has become evident** (somewhat unsurprisingly) **that room for criti­cal interventions in policy practice is fairly limited**. A far more worrying issue, however, is the observation that **critical theory is increasingly lacking in relevance in contribut­ing to the revitalisation of policy practice or perceptive critiques of it**. **This is because of** **the abstract and theory-driven nature of critical theory and its lack of realistic under­standing as to how to challenge the dominance of hegemonic ideas in today’s foreign policy practice**. As Richard Youngs has argued **in relation to critical theoretical inves­tigations of democracy support, critical theorists today are dangerously behind the curve on policy practices and theoretically obsessed with critiques of little use to prac­titioners**.1 **It really is rather disappointing for – and a disappointing symptom of – alternative, or so-called ‘critical’, thinking in the social sciences that even when the problems of the dominant model are evident, there is no real systematic, effective or realistic opposition to it**. Why is there such a dearth of successful or influential ‘critical’ thinking even in the relatively ‘fruitful’ context of multiple social and economic crises? This is a big question, requiring, for an adequate treatment, a holistic sociological study conducted on multiple levels of analysis of society. Nothing of this nature can be attempted here, but we can, and arguably should, on the 40th anniversary of *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* – one of the leading critical theory journals in International Relations (IR) – reflect on some of the key trends in critical and philosophical research in IR, with the hope that this might reveal something characteristic of wider trends. With this in mind, I reflect on the prospects of critical theoretical analysis in IR and, in so doing, hope to add a new angle (or rather reintroduce an old angle) to assessment of critical theory’s role in IR. Despite many excellent reviews of the development and fortunes of critical and phil­osophical research in IR,2 **few have analysed in detail the curious depoliticising and fragmentation-oriented trends afflicting critical theory**

**and associated forms of philo­sophical analysis today**. Also, **few analysts have dared to openly comment on the striking failures of critical theory to bring about or facilitate progressive change in today’s world political environment.** It is my aim here to open the discussion towards a more (self-)critical analysis of critical theory in IR.